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ABSTRACT
After the USSR's dissolution, Russia struggled to reassert its Great Power status by
enhancing its internal might and territorial cohesion. Futile military campaigns against the
rebellious Chechen people pushed the Kremlin to strike a bargain with an unorthodox
warlord: Ramzan Kadyrov, who was to become a faithful ally, while in return Chechnya
received an unprecedented level of autonomy. This thesis examines the dynamics of
Kadyrov's ascent to power, specifically the Islamization of public space and the
monopolization of Chechen security forces, and concludes that, in the long run, the
unwavering consolidation of his rule menaces Russia's re-emerging 'greatness'.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The Geopolitics of Boundaries: Territory and Power
"Territorial issues are so fundamental that the behavior associated with their settlement literally
constructs a world order."1
The scholarship of International Relations in the late twentieth century is filled with
observers who emphasize the diminishing importance of interstate boundaries. Ken’ichi Ohmae’s
“Borderless World” (1991), James Rosenau’s “Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond
Globalization” (2003), Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson’s “Globalization in Question” (1999)
and a significant number of other scholarly works advance theories announcing the decline of
states’ territorial impermeability. Defenders of global interconnectedness and interdependence go
as far as to make the state’s internal affairs a matter of international concern. One of the most
controversial illustrations of this philosophy is Article 73.b in the UN Charter, according to
which the members of the United Nations “accept as a sacred trust the obligation” to stay alert to
the political aspirations of the peoples that reside in non-self governing territories, and “to assist
them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.”2 In
other words, created to “maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,”3 the United
Nations legitimized the idea that military force and violation of territorial sovereignty can be
lawfully undertaken if they are permissible under the Charter.

1

John A. Vasquez. The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.151.
Charter of the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter11.shtml
3
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Despite the increasingly popular belief in a world sans frontières, a concurrent countertrend of thought announces “the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be
used to alter interstate boundaries,” known as the “territorial integrity norm.” 4 Since the
establishment of the Westphalian order at the end of the Thirty-Year’s War in 1648, and until the
middle of the twentieth century, interstate borders were far from the modern model of fixed
geopolitical entities. Territory was a matter of purchase, inheritance, marriage, and most
importantly, the underlying objective of many wars.5 Consequently, authority over pieces of land
constantly shifted and often overlapped. However, the introduction of the delimited territorial
state with exclusive authority over its domain comprised part of the transition from the medieval
to the modern world, which was a gradual process that took several centuries. For instance,
surveyed national borders emerged only in the eighteenth century. 6 This phenomenon, later
characterized as "a basic rule of co-existence," became a key geopolitical feature of our time.7

Furthermore, one can hypothesize that the notions of modernity and territoriality are
closely intertwined; imposing territorial limits embodies the modern projects of ordering and
clarifying the fragmented human habitat. In his article “The Territorial Integrity Norm:
International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” Mark Zacher offers his personal vision of the
extensively codified rigidity of the world’s territorial order, based on a thorough analysis of the
major stages of human “co-existence.” In his opinion, the growing importance of the territorial
integrity is expressed by a combination of instrumental and ideational interests: instrumental
4

Mark W. Zacher. "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force".
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Cambridge University Press, 1991, p 307.
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reasons concern perceptions of how a norm and congruent practices benefit the self-interests of
countries and help avoid major wars; ideational reasons pertain to changing views of ethical
behavior toward other peoples and states in the process of building human rights regimes. 8
According to many indicators, the “territorial integrity norm” maintains its role as a central pillar
of the international order, despite the arguments about the dubious nature of modern interstate
delineation: “Boundaries have not been frozen, but states have been effectively proscribed from
altering them by force. The multistate political and security order is clearly stronger than many
political observers think in that the society of states has largely eliminated what scholars have
identified as the major source of enduring rivalries and the frequency and intensity of warfare.”9
If one envisions the modern mosaic of fixed boundaries, it would be logical to identify the parties
that take the most interest in preserving the geopolitical status quo. The norm has been crucial
for the establishment of the authority of Great Powers in post World War II international society
by setting up a framework of “legitimatization of material inequality in the international
system.”10 Thus, the Great Powers have played a central role in instituting and guaranteeing the
“territorial integrity norm,” which helped them secure their vast possessions and perpetuate the
inequality of territorial rights.

Additionally, in the context of establishing regional balances of power, the norm has
proved to be helpful in virtue of its being “a legitimate reason to prevent aspiring states from
acquiring certain coveted territories, the possession of which could propel changes in regional

8
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and even global balances of power.”11 It follows that territorial integrity expresses the authority
of Great Powers, inherently articulating their ambitions to preserve geopolitical hegemony and
ensure omnipresent control within their boundaries. In order to explain the origin of such
aspirations, John Mearsheimer proposed five assumptions about the international system.
According to him, “Sovereignty inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the
international system.” 12 Consequently, the international system is essentially anarchic since there
is no central authority above independent states. Secondly, within this system, Great Powers
represent a fundamental danger to each other in light of their offensive military capabilities.
Thirdly, states can never be certain about other states’ intentions, resulting in a great number of
possible causes of aggression. Importantly, the fourth assumption echoes the principles of the
territorial integrity norm, identifying survival and the autonomy of domestic political order as the
primary goals of Great Powers: “Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is
conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims.” 13 Basic survival thus requires
preserving intact the Great Power’s domain, producing in turn the fifth principle, according to
which Great Powers are cautious, rational actors that “are aware of their external environment
and they think strategically about how to survive in it.” 14

Mearsheimer’s theory suggests that states gain Great Power status in the process of
calculations and predictions vis-à-vis other states, and that only the most alert and the most
cautious can successfully attain it. However, because basic survival remains the prerequisite to
complex geopolitical games, internal strength and cohesiveness constitute the key component of
11
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power. Similarly, A.F.K. Organski argues that one of the most critical aspects of strong states is
their ability to establish the monopoly of force in a territory and that such monopoly “must rest in
the hands of any effective government.” 15 He adds that thereby an efficient governmental
bureaucracy must maintain full control of force, utilizing resources in pursuit of the country’s
goals. As these scholars’ works suggest, many indicators remind us of the essential value of
impermeable territoriality, as increasing globalization disguises it. A well-guarded vast territory
translates to strength; it is a symbol of the state’s internal might and the basis of its ambitions.
Since the politics of Great Powers are still in place, the world order upholds a complex territorial
framework that has emerged in the course of competition for hegemonic domination.

15

Abramo Fimo and Kenneth Organski. World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1968, p.172.
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1.2. Russia as a Great Power, or the Paradox of Territoriality
Numerous scholars have been perplexed by the many faces of Russia. Often described as
impossible to understand, to predict, or to conquer, the country has developed a distinct
geopolitical character due to a number of unique historical experiences, and it hardly fits any
rigid classification. The simple question “Is Russia a Great Power?” generates a mosaic of
concepts: “a great power manqué,” 16 “an aggrieved great power,” 17 “a re-emerging great
power,” 18 or even “a prodigal superpower.” 19 The international community has been hesitant
about recognizing Russia as a consequential hegemon, largely due to its civilizational differences
and despotic methods of governance. Only when Peter the Great imported Western traditions to
Russian society and enabled the country to project power externally did European leaders start
seeking Russia as an ally. This process accelerated after its victory over the regional top-ranking
power of Sweden in 1721.20 However, these alliances stemmed less from increased congruity
than wary respect. As Russian vice-chancellor Peter Shafirov (1670–1739) noted, “if they seek
our alliance, it is rather through fear and hate than through feelings of friendship.”21

On the other hand, Russia has long perceived itself as a strong state, maintaining
“greatness” as an essential component of its existence. The state’s hegemonic ambitions were the
most visible after the defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, and after the dissolution of the USSR.

16

Iver B Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending. Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010.
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19
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Following the defeat of the Tsarist troops in the Crimean War, Russian Foreign Minister
Gorchakov (1798 – 1883) said: “Rossiia sosredotachivaetsia” (Russia is focussing/concentrating
herself).22 After the break-up of the USSR, many Russian scholars repeated this expression to
highlight the country’s state of shock after losing its Great Power status. Importantly, the phrase
rests upon the anticipated transience of this period of weakness, suggesting that in a short time
Russia would return to the international arena as a superpower. To reaffirm the country’s might
and to prove that it matters globally, Russia employed a number of strategies that other powers
often perceived as aggressive, nationalistic, and threatening: “Whether supporting separatist
groups in neighboring states, cutting off gas to Belarus and Ukraine, or standing up for Iran at the
UN Security Council, Russian foreign policy often appeared dangerously anachronistic in the
West – even before its invasion of Georgia in support of the South Ossetian separatists.”23 Many
observers commented on the difficulties that Russia faces because of its old-fashioned
understanding of being a “hard power”, which poses problems in a globally networked world.
However, despite the difficulties and critiques that the country receives in light of its hostility,
Russia of the twenty-first century has diverged from its relative weakness in the 1990s, regaining
its status as a consequential international actor.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly-born Russian Federation’s primary
objectives were survival and the preservation of rigid borders, a strategy which echoes one of
Mearsheimer’s assumptions. Typically for an aspiring Great Power, territoriality became one of
the country’s main preoccupations because, as demonstrated in the previous section, the
monopoly of force and omnipresent control buttress internal strength and enable external
22

Luks, http://hnn.us/articles/103288.html
Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Lanham, Md: Rowman
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ambitions. For a fragile federation torn apart by the secessionist tendencies of its subjects, there
was little to do other than negotiate on the basis of the particular interests of each republic and
region. The periphery’s responses varied. Most were willing to sign bilateral treaties, thus
constructing what came to be known as Yeltsin’s asymmetric federalism. However, out of the
twenty-one ethnic republics, the level of autonomy allowed by such agreements differed.
Tatarstan was the first republic to sign a bilateral treaty and it had received much more
independence from Moscow than republics with similar religious, geographic and economic
characteristics: “As the first republic to reach an agreement with the Kremlin, this Muslim
republic on the Volga became a paradigm for the other ethnic regions.” 24 In the context of
Russia’s pursuit of reinforced territorial integrity, the Tatarstan model was a risky journey to
undertake, but the center’s demonstration of flexibility helped curb the remaining secessionist
tendencies. Meanwhile, Tatarstan enjoyed an unprecedented level of autonomy achieved via
dialogue and collaboration.

In contrast to the peaceful nature of Tatarstan’s re-integration, the Chechen model
symbolizes a different path, characterized primarily by violent resistance. The Chechens defied
the Russian empire until 1864; Stalin brutally deported them in 1944. So when in 1991 an
opportunity to secede emerged on the horizon, the Chechen Republic leaped to achieve its
ambitions. Chechnya’s capacity to assert its independence was enhanced by its leader’s
(Dzhokhar Dudaev) close involvement in Russian military corruption and arms trading, which
facilitated a rapid militarization process through the seizure and purchasing of Soviet military

24

Nicole Balkind and Graeme B. Robertson, A Model Republic? Trust and Authoritarianism on
Tatarstan's Road to Autonomy. UNC Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection. Chapel Hill, N.C.:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009, p. 2.
8

hardware.25 After fighting two wars, Russia technically retained Chechnya’s territory within its
realm, but in reality the Republic’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov “has now asserted a greater degree of
autonomy even than was sought in 1991-92, and has been described as the “Warrior King” of
Chechnya.”26 Kadyrov expresses his most sincere loyalty towards the Kremlin and calls himself
Putin’s ally. However, under this mask of peaceful collaboration, more characteristic for the
Tatarstan model, the Chechen leader seems to hide a more complex set of objectives, including
acquiring a domestic Chechen army, building a luxurious infrastructure, and gaining more control
over its resources by constructing a major oil refinery.

Given its weakness after the fall of the USSR, the Russian government did the best it
could to ensure the preservation of its territory in pursuit of the ambitious geopolitical objectives
of a re-emerging Great Power. By managing models that varied from peaceful collaboration to
armed resistance, the federation succeeded in taming such key domestic actors as Tatarstan and
Chechnya. However, a number of uncertainties challenge the seamless picture. The alleged
superpower consciously allowed for the existence of geopolitical enclaves within its territory, and
with the help of these “failures” it managed not only to “survive”, but to reassert its internal
strength. In other words, in the context of Putin’s doctrine of state strengthening, outsourcing
sovereignty to local agents paradoxically ensured the primacy of territoriality. However, can a
country whose sovereignty is a compound of overlapping authorities be a Great Power – a title
that assumes internal cohesiveness and omnipresent control effectuated by the government’s
bureaucracy?

25

Richard Sakwa. Chechnya: From Past to Future. London: Anthem Press, 2005, p.273.
Marc Weller and Katherine Nobbs. Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, p.57.
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While Tatarstan represents a reliable ally who has been integrated within Russia since
1552 and who consciously made the choice of collaborating with the center, the case of
Chechnya is different. The enclave has come to possess a vast autonomy as Ramzan Kadyrov
seized control of all security forces in the territory, largely due to the carte blanche given to him
by the Kremlin. While Chechnya seems to have adopted the peaceful Tatarstan model of CenterPeriphery relations, the memories of violent resistance and de-facto independence cannot be
dismissed. Beneath the promises of loyalty, the Republic is governed as a personal fiefdom,
creating a significant threat to the Kremlin’s monopoly of force. And yet, the Chechen warlord
seems to have greatly contributed to re-establishing and legitimizing Moscow’s presence in the
Republic in spite of the common perception of warlords as state destroyers. Russia struck a
bargain with a deviant warlord: he was to become a “peacelord” and an ally in the federation’s
pursuit of power, while in return Chechnya received an unprecedented level of autonomy. In the
context of this compromise, does keeping Chechnya within the federation reinforce or undermine
Russia’s acquisition of Great Power status?

10

2. Theoretical Framework: Who is Great, and Who is Not
"To me, I confess that [countries] are pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a
great game for the domination of the world."
Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, 189827
Two kings, two queens, four rooks, four knights, four bishops, sixteen pawns - there is an
unlimited number of ways to manipulate the thirty-two pieces. The goal never changes, though.
One strives to mislead the opponent till his king is under threat of capture. To put it in the
perspective of our basic instincts, on the chessboard of the world one always strives for power.
And what about the strategies that we invent to succeed? Among the great number of debates
regarding the nature underlying human actions and desires, two seventeenth century thinkers,
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, embody the general dualist scheme of conceptualizing the
international arena of humankind’s interactions: pessimistic realists versus optimistic liberals.

It all goes back to the hypothetical state of nature. Hobbes argued that a state of nature
very easily transforms into a state of war. Where there is no effective Sovereign to keep men’s
passions in check, one finds a place of “continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life
of man, solitary, poor, nasty brutish, and short.”28 Hobbes’s natural world develops in continual
motion since, blinded by his personal desires, man’s attempt to acquire power after power never
ceases, thus creating a situation of ever-present hostility. Furthermore, to Hobbes, little
differentiates right and wrong except for personal opinion or social construct: “For these words of
good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being
nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the
27
28

John Pilger. The New Rulers of the World. London: Verso, 2002. p.101.
Steven M. Cahn. Classics of Western Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 1990, p.502.
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nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man.”29 Given moral relativity, there
is also a constantly changing pattern of power balance: while there are some who are stronger
than others, the weak are capable of forming confederacies to kill the stronger and be strong
themselves.30

On the contrary, Locke criticized Hobbes because in his view, the state of nature is “a
state of liberty”, and “not a state of license.”31 Driven by “peace, good will, mutual assistance,
and preservation”, everyone in the state of nature is “bound to preserve himself, and not to quit
his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes in competition, ought
he…to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not…take away, or impair the life, or what tends to
the preservation of the life the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”32 Since Locke envisions
men in a more positive way, he is often said to be the father of liberal, or idealist theory of
international relations. In addition to Locke’s philosophy, liberals largely base their ideas on the
Enlightenment’s belief in reason’s ability to make the world a better place. The optimistic view
of international politics rests on three pillars. Firstly, states are the main actors on the
international arena and some of their internal arrangements (e.g. democracy) are inherently
preferable to others (e.g. dictatorship), which divides the world into good and bad states.33 The
good ones adopt cooperative policies, whereas the bad ones conflict with other states. Secondly,
liberals do not emphasize calculations of power because they deem other kinds of political and
economic calculations more important for understanding the behavior of good states. In their

29

Cahn, p.496
Kenneth Deutsch and Joseph Fornieri. An Invitation to Political Thought. Boston, MA: Thomson
Higher Education, 2009, p.238
31
John Locke. Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. Macpherson. Indianapolis/Cambridge 1980, p.9.
32
Ibid.
33
John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001.
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view, even if bad states were motivated by the desire to gain power at the expense of other states,
in an ideal world, where there are only good states, power would be largely irrelevant.

In contrast to such a utopian perception of the world of international affaires, realists rely
on Hobbes’s discourse on human nature to evidence states’ persistent search for power. They
agree that a conflict-free world is a desirable asset, but argue that the reality of security
competition and war is inescapable. They share their first core belief with the liberals: realists
envision states as the principal actors in world politics. Importantly, the focus lies predominantly
on great powers and their games of domination. Secondly, realists do not draw sharp distinctions
between “good” and “bad” states, because power is the overarching logic that dictates states’
actions regardless of their culture or political system. This point opposes liberal tendencies to
discriminate among countries on the basis of their goodness and badness. The differences in
relative power are the only indicator that matters. Lastly, realists believe that for understanding
great powers’ behavior, internal factors are irrelevant. The external influences and competition
for power determine states’ objectives and actions to achieve them, which sometimes necessitates
launching a war.

Considering the length of this thesis, it is impossible to cover all the nuances
characteristic to the two main directions in the theoretical flow of international relations. Let us
go directly to a particular concept that has been developed and utilized predominantly in the
camp of realists, but spread to many other discourses – the state as a great power and the special
attention its leaders have to pay to the balance of power. One of the fathers of IR realism Kenneth
Waltz points out that the number of consequential states is small and historically people reach
general consensus on a period’s great powers. Only in relations among these great powers can
13

we assume rough equality of power while the remaining states have to adapt to the existing
scheme: “Viewed as the politics of the powerful, international politics can be studied in terms of
the logic of small-number systems.”34 What does a state have to possess to win the title of a great
power? According to Waltz, states achieve top ranking based on the following criteria: size of
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political
stability and competence.35 Similarly, one of the foremost IR British scholars of the twentieth
century Martin Wight defines a great power’s basic components as size of population, strategic
position and geographical extent, and economic resources and industrial production, to which he
adds ‘softer’ elements like education, technological skills, and moral cohesion.36

Most concisely, as Paul Kennedy’s argues, a great power is “a state capable of holding its
own against any other nation.” 37 This description emphasizes a number of aspects similar to
Wight’s famous definition of a great power as “a power that can confidently contemplate war
against any other existing single power.” 38 The majority of the most widely used definitions
revolve around the countries’ ability to launch a military attack and to defend themselves, which
resonates with Hans Morgenthau’s acute awareness of the material aspects of power: “What
distinguishes the superpowers from all other nations, aside from their ability to wage all-out
nuclear war and absorb a less than all-out nuclear attack, is their virtual industrial self-sufficiency

34

Kenneth Neal Waltz. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House, 1979, p.131.
Ibid.
36
Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad. Power Politics. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978,
p.26.
37
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and their technological capacity to stay abreast of the other nations.” 39 As it can be seen on a
general level and particularly in Morgenthau’s discourse, among all the criteria necessary for the
desired honorable title of greatness
eatness, military power is of supreme importance.

The task of identifying the current great powers is a controversial one aand
nd is much easier
to carry out retrospectively.. After the Cold War’s bipolar power division, the world lived through
a period of American
erican hegemony, and currently experiences a phase of multi-polarity.
polarity. The table
below presents a projection of bilateral relationships that could develop among great powers
(identified by the author) throughout the XXI century. The letters L, M, and H stand
stan for low,
medium or high probability of increasing future rivalry.

Figure 1: The Future of
Great Powers: Military and
Economic
mic Rivalries40

39

Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred E.
Knopf, 1985 p.126.
40
Charles W. Kegley, World Politics: Trend and Transformation. Belmont,
nt, Calif: Wadsworth, 2009, p.
117.
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As we see, the chart identifies the USA, Japan, the EU, Russia and China as the leading
forces shaping international politics today. Another place to look for the states with a great power
status are international organizations. The United Nations Security Council oversees the
maintenance of international peace and security, thus playing a key role in regulating the balance
of power. Even though it consists of 15 members, they are divided into 10 elected temporary
members and the five veto-wielding states that are present in the Council on a permanent basis. In
the context of this scheme, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France and Russia can
be identified as an alternative way of defining the world’s leading powers. Another interesting
example of a locus of power is the G8 – The Group of Eight. It is an unorthodox international
institution of eight of the world's largest economies. Its informal modus operandi and the fact that
it is relatively unburdened by bureaucracy have enabled state leaders to establish strong personal
connections during their annual forums, which made the domain of great power politics more
visible.41 According to this economically based framework, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Russia are the modern Titan Atlas holding the
world of international affairs on its shoulders.

Finally, Great Power status is hard to win because it is largely based on a vague
consensual basis accrued over a long period of time, similarly to an individual’s reputation.
However, military and economic strength can help a country win a position of privilege more
quickly and regardless of the others’ unwillingness to disturb the laboriously constructed status
quo. Russia’s or China’s presence among the great powers exemplifies this: no matter how much
Western criticism targets these powers, their military and economic strength qualify them to be

41

Peter I. Hajnal. The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation. Aldershot, England:
Ashgate, 2007, p.2.
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integrated into the modern scheme of international multi-polarity. The remarks regarding such
newly-emerged rivals are often based on the fact that in spite of winning the title of a Great
Power, they are not “strong states.” However, can a country be a weak Great Power? It seems
that in the context of state strength, there has also been two diverging paths of thought. On the
one hand, state strength can be rationalized as a force in its own right that pursues its own
interests against those of the market, society and the individual. Max Weber’s definition of the
state as an entity that successfully “claims the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a
certain territory”42 and Michael Mann's neo-Weberian definition of the state as “a territorially
demarcated, differentiated set of institutions and personnel with a center that exercises
authoritative rulemaking backed by the coercive powers of the state”43 resonate with the realist
idea of the supremacy of power relations in any social construct. On the other hand, a liberal
theorist would characterize a strong state as a defender of individual liberties, rights of property
and as a regulator of market relations. Consequently, as we try to understand what one means by
a “strong state”, a contradiction emerges: “The former would be a ‘well-ordered police state’,
whereas the latter would be a pluralistic society.44 The heated debate between realist and liberal
camps of International Relations theorists demonstrates that the concept of a strong, efficient
state rests upon the violent-peaceful antagonism of the hypothetical human nature.

42

Max Weber. Political Writings, edited by Lassman and R. Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994, p.311.
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3. The Promises of Federalism: Tatarstan as a Paradigm of Sustainable
Center-Periphery Relations
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia witnessed a parade of conflicts resulting
from the state’s inability to accommodate the demands of its ethnic regions. Federalism proved to
be the best solution for a country that was being torn apart by its tense center-periphery relations
because “over the course of the twentieth century federalism has gone from being viewed as a
weak and transitory form of government to being portrayed as a virtual panacea for states torn by
ethnic conflict and even as a pattern for future regional integration.” 45 For an aspiring Great
Power, the federal model of governance was essential to manage its internal and external security.
As Peter Merkl emphasizes, “most modern federations originated in response to extraordinary
challenges from abroad and at home. They sought the greater security and international power of
a larger state.”46 Russia is unique, considering its long-lasting security dilemma: the country’s
history is saturated with an abundant number of invasions by the Mongols, the Poles, the
Lithuanians, the Turks, the French, and the Germans. Thus, rather than creating geopolitical
alliances that would augment its defensive capabilities, retaining a single, omnipresent control
over its regions seemed the most sustainable strategy. The fall of the USSR demonstrated that
federalism was “the way to keep Russia together in the absence of a powerful central government,
thus preserving the enhanced security provided by the collective capabilities of all of Russia.”47

The remarks above explain the reasoning underlying Yeltsin’s asymmetric federalism,
notably the proliferation of bilateral treaties between the federal center and its subjects. Tatarstan
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was the first republic to sign such a power-sharing agreement, which granted it an unprecedented
level of autonomy. Consequently, the Republic became a paradigm for other federal subjects, a
model of how to obtain vast autonomy without threats of violence or secession. Furthermore,
Tatarstan offered a template for sustainable center-periphery relations within a re-emerging
superpower. Russia’s goal to gain a monopoly of force in its entire territory coincided with the
Tatars’ willingness to play along. In contrast, Chechnya’s violent resistance ran in stark
opposition to the rules dictated by the Kremlin. During the crisis of 1992-1993, Tatarstan’s
President Shaimiyev, unlike the leaders of Chechnya, rejected any discussion of secession and
consistently spoke about a new federative relationship with Moscow.48

Thus, in April 1992, Shaimiyev announced that signing the Federative Treaty was a matter
finding “a new formula of Tatarstan’s status, while preserving the integrity of the Russian
Federation.”49 Undoubtedly, the 1994 treaty between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan was a
risky compromise since it failed to amend the subject’s constitution, according to which Tatarstan
was a sovereign state (Article 61). And yet, by signing the agreement, the Republic agreed to
define itself as a state “united with the Russian Federation by the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, and by the treaty on the demarcation of
areas of responsibility and mutual delegation of powers between the organs of state power of the
Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan.” 50 The legal
contradictions did not seem to trouble Yeltsin, who openly invited Tatarstan to take “as much
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sovereignty as it could swallow.” 51 To re-establish Russia’s Great Power status through the
channel of functioning federalism, Yeltsin was ready to fulfill the Republic’s demands by turning
a blind eye on any disparities between the two constitutions.

At the same time, Yeltsin determined that “the preferential treatment of Tatarstan would not
be a general “model” for an overhaul of federal relations.”52 By convincing the Republic to stay,
he demonstrated the extent of his generosity to the remaining deviants, while the federation’s
territorial integrity remained intact. According to Monica Toft, the successful cooperation was
possible because both Tatar and Russian demands were moderated: Tatar leaders chose to have
more control over their economy than their identity, while the Federal government set precedent
for the other ethnic regions: “In the Moscow-Tatar interaction, we find the Tatars representing
their interests in divisible terms…Their weak demographic presence in the region precluded them
from representing Tatarstan as the domain of Tatars only. Economics were at the heart of this
conflict, not identity.” 53 Importantly, in 1989, 68% of all Tatars in Russia lived outside the
Republic. Within Tatarstan, ethnic Tatars were a minority in which Tatars constituted 48.5% and
ethnic Russians 43.5% of the Republic’s population.54 These statistics manifest the long shared
history of the two peoples.

When in 1552 Ivan the Terrible conquered Kazan, the capital of the Khanate of Kazan (the
legacy of the Mongol Empire), he ensured a strong visible presence of Moscow in the area. In
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fact, in the nineteenth century, Kazan became the center of conversion to Orthodox Christianity
and other aspects of Slavic colonization: “A working relationship between the two groups
developed as the Russian Empire spread eastwards, with the Tatars increasingly functioning as
middlemen between the Christian imperial center and the newly conquered Turkic people,
facilitating economic and political transactions between the two.”55 Consequently, the history of
Russo-Tatar relations is one of a long, relatively peaceful co-existence, which explains
Tatarstan’s willingness to cooperate in the nineties, and lays the foundation of “The Tatarstan
Model”.

The term "The Tatarstan Model" was first mentioned in 1994 during the Republic’s
President Mintimer Shaimiev's visit to Harvard University. 56 In "Qualified Sovereignty: The
Tatarstan Model for Resolving Conflicting Loyalties," Alexei Zverev endeavored to define the
major components of the model, which resulted in a sum of six factors: (1) Tatarstan’s
landlocked position in the center of Russia with the Volga cutting across its territory; (2) the biethnic composition of its population (Tatar/Russian); (3) the existence of a large Tatar diaspora
outside Tatarstan. The three remaining factors emphasize the importance of almost 450 years of
existence with Russia, the role of a highly experienced leader like Shaimiyev, and the economic
component – the Republic’s oil and numerous industries. 57 In addition, Zverev argues that at the
heart of the Tatarstan Model, one should see a peaceful resolution of conflicts between the
Republic and the Center and the peaceful resolution of conflicts within the Republic itself.
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Monica Toft, however, comprehends this geopolitical arrangement as a natural
consequence of the Republic’s geographic position, completely enclosed in Russian territory.
Furthermore, her statistics showing Tatar ethnic dilution over time, presented earlier in the
chapter, explained why Tatars who were dispersed across Russia did not believe in the idea of
Tatarstan as the Tatars’ true homeland. Thus, on the one hand, the Tatars chose to demand what
they could legitimately demand in the context of their geographic and economic position, which
resulted in a "qualified sovereignty." However, on the other hand, even though Tatarstan
appeared to have gained more sovereignty than necessary or “safe” within a Great Power,
Russia's position remained unwavering, largely manipulating the Tatar independence movement
by making a few concessions.58

Chechnya presents us with a different set of geographical and historical factors that stand
in stark contrast to the reasons underlying Tatarstan’s willingness to cooperate. Firstly, unlike
Tatarstan, Chechnya inhabits the outskirts of Russia, and shares a border with Georgia and
Azerbaijan. Secondly, while the territory of Tatarstan comprises a plain with less forest than any
other parts of Russia, most of Chechnya is “an endless space of hills dressed in woods.” 59
Starting from the first contact with the Russian Empire, Chechnya’s resistance has been largely
defined as armed guerrilla warfare in which the landscape was of crucial importance: “The
Caucasus imposes two of the most difficult modes of war on an invading army: mountain and
forest warfare… Both give enormous advantages to the defenders… Before any battle the
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invaders have to overcome nature.”60 Thirdly, while in the case of Tatarstan “the centuries that
have passed since the fall of the Tatar Khanates created a certain “void” in the history of national
statehood,”61 Chechnya’s traumatic memories of the 1817−1864 Caucasian War and the mass
deportation in 1944 were fairly ‘fresh’ in the minds of the local populace at the moment of the
USSR’s dissolution. Lastly, according to the census of 1989, 65.7% of the population in the
Chechen republic were Chechens and only 24.8% were Russians. At the same time, in 1989,
Tatars made up 48.5% of the population in Tatarstan, while 43.3% of the population were
Russians, producing an approximate parity between the two ethnic groups. In Chechnya,
conversely, the local population outnumbered an ethnic Russian minority. 62 In the course of our
further discussion, these factors will help us understand the violent nature of the initial Chechen
struggle for independence, but they will also reveal the paradoxical development of Chechnya at
present, notably Ramzan Kadyrov’s loyalty towards the Kremlin.
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4. Yeltsin’s and Putin’s Presidencies, or How a Centrifuge Metamorphosed
into a Tight Fist

The mission of welding a fragmented Russia into a unified state stems from the mosaic of
historical periods and rulers in its vast territory over the past millennium. Stalin’s overt praise of
Ivan IV and Peter the Great, which was shocking at that time because of its potential pro-tsarist
agenda, represented nothing more than a realization of historical continuities and recurrent goals
in his and their rule: state building, unification, and enhanced control. Stalin actively emphasized
the positive effects of state consolidation by these monarchs against the boyars and other forces
of decentralization: “Not one country in the world can count on preserving its independence, and
on serious economical and cultural growth, if it could not liberate itself from feudal
fragmentation and from princely mess”.63 Even though Russia’s third millennium opened with a
new president filled with modernizing zeal, his pursuit of political order drew from the lessons of
the past rulers who had emphasized the strength of the country.

Vladimir Putin made his agenda clear from his very first address to the Federal Assembly,
which placed him within the historical constellation of state consolidators, with Ivan IV, Peter the
Great and Stalin. In his first address to the Federal Assembly in 2000, Putin stressed that
“competition for power” between the center and regional powers had been “destructive.” 64 He
urged the Assembly members that Russia must not remain a “weak state” and that “the only
realistic choice” for it was to be a strong country: “We have to recognize that the state itself was
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largely responsible for the growing strength of the unofficial, shadow economy, the spread of
corruption and the flow of great quantities of money abroad… An inefficient state is the main
reason for our long and deep crisis – I am absolutely convinced of this.” 65 Indeed, Putin’s
direction emerged like a breath of fresh air after many troubled years of uncertainty about the
country’s future, as “someone akin to a Jacobin French republican state builder: seeking to ensure
the universal and equal application of the constitution and the laws, accompanied by the
homogenisation of political space and the establishment of a stable set of political institutions.”66
As often happens in games of power, while the phenomenon of decentralization embodied the
deathbed of Yeltsin’s presidency, it became Putin’s springboard.

Yeltsin’s presidency can be characterized as an epoch of asymmetric federalism. In order
to contain tensions among the Federation’s subjects, he was obliged to make many concessions to
its twenty constituent republics. The Federal Treaty, signed in 1992, epitomized segmented
regionalism because it selectively recognized the republics as sovereign entities within the
Russian Federation and granted them the right to adopt their own constitutions as well as a vast
autonomy over their internal budgets, foreign trade and, most importantly, natural resources.
Thus, for instance, Article III of the Treaty granted republics the prerogative to co-determine with
Moscow issues concerning the proprietorship, utilization rights, and disposal rights of land,
mineral resources, and other natural resources including water within their own jurisdictions.67
While Yeltsin’s allies were rendered free to enjoy unchecked power, the provinces remained
dissatisfied with such obvious discrimination. Even though the text of the Federal Treaty was
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later excluded from the 1993 Constitution, which proclaimed the equality of all subjects of the
Federation, the hierarchy outlined earlier remained intact.68 Such a poorly managed process of
power distribution between the center, the republics and the provinces proved to be a major
barrier to consolidating Russia.

Furthermore, Yeltsin’s strategy to garner political support from regional and republican
leaders resulted in the “Parade of treaties,” a series of bilateral treaties with federal units created
in order to manage the center-periphery relationship. Tatarstan became the first federal subject
who signed such a treaty with Moscow in February 1994, and eventually forty-six of eighty-nine
federal units followed its example.69 In the context of this official asymmetric structure, regional
leaders gained the ability to exert influence over their jurisdictions and economic resources, thus
transferring control over many federal structures. Police, tax collectors, judges, and other federal
officials increasingly fell under the influence of local elites who buttressed their power with the
help of ‘self-made’ constitutions. They habitually ignored federal legislation, which resulted in
many instances of legal chaos such as Tatarstan's law on citizenship, according to which a
resident of Tatarstan could hold Tatarstani citizenship without keeping Russian citizenship – an
obvious contradiction with Russian Federal law.70

When Vladimir Putin took office as president in May 2000, he introduced a wave of
federal reforms, signaling a new stage of re-centralization. Legal distress dictated the introduction
of Putin’s initiative: out of twenty republics, Udmurt was the only one whose constitution fully
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complied with the 1993 Federal Constitution. Moreover, reports showed that 30 percent of local
acts adopted by the republics violated federal laws.71 In order to ameliorate the status quo, Putin’s
federal reform attempted to homogenize the juridical space by appointing presidential
representatives in the seven newly established federal districts, amend the structure of the
Federation Council, and introduce the federal supervision of regional executives and parliaments.
By April 2002, Putin nullified thirty of forty-two federal-regional bilateral treaties that had been
signed with the forty-six regions.72 In addition, to cleanse the country’s juridical space of the
violations of federal laws, Putin created the mechanism of “federal intervention” that enabled the
Russian president to remove regional chief executives or disband regional legislative bodies.73

One of the most controversial aspects of Putin’s statism was his desire to establish a
‘dictatorship of law.’ He employed this phrase for the first time at a conference of chairs of
regional courts in 2000. The ambitious president lamented the fact that Russians appeared to have
become subjects of different regions rather than citizens of a single country and emphasised that
“the dictatorship of law is the only kind of dictatorship which we must obey,” arguing that
unchecked freedom

“inevitably degenerates into chaos and lawlessness.” 74 However, the

dictatorial approach spilled over the legal sphere. The strategy became increasingly politicized
due to Putin’s decision to surround himself with his former KGB colleagues from St. Petersburg
and bureaucrats from power ministries (siloviki) - elite leaders of the Federal Security Service
(FSB), the Ministry of Internal Affaires (MVD), the Ministry of Foreign Affaires (MID) and the
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Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

75

As estimated by the Russian sociologist Olga

Kryshtanovskaya, the proportion of all the 4.5 million siloviki in the national and regional
leadership rose from 3.7% under Gorbachev to 25.1% under Putin, and in the top leadership the
percentages were 4.8 and 58.3 respectively.76 These facts demonstrate how unwilling Putin was
to work with political groups whose views differed from those espoused by the Kremlin. The
members of Putin’s vertikal of power not only curtailed the independence of regional elites but
also suppressed independent mass media and limited the power of oligarchs, even imprisoning
dissidents for dubious reasons (e.g. the case of Khodorkovsky).77
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5. Chechnya as a Cornerstone of Putin’s state building project
“And the tribes of those gorges are savage/Their god is freedom, their law –war”
M. Lermotov, 184378
When the famous Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov so eloquently captured the essence of
the freedom-loving Chechen soul in his poem “Ismail-Bei” in 1843, he could not have imagined
how strongly his words would resonate throughout the entire complex history of Russo-Chechen
relations. When in 1817 Russian General Yermolov started erecting forts and sending expeditions
to destroy Chechen villages and to burn crops, he should have known that conquering a people
whose god is freedom is an arduous journey. Defeated by the Russian empire in the long 18171864 Caucasian war and ravaged by the deportations of 1944,79 Chechnya could not miss the
opportunities that opened up with Yeltsin’s unstable rule. Consequently, the region plunged into
two consecutive wars separated by two periods of de facto independence: 1991-1994 and 19961999.

At the beginning of the third millennium, Putin’s reinforced statist aspirations altered the
approach to managing the recurring conflict in Chechnya and attuned it with the mindset of
siloviki, who believe in full conformity and for whom the ideas of Russia as a great power
(derzhavnost) and Russia as a strong state (gosudarstvennost) are quintessential for the
consolidation of federal governance. For instance, in his 2000 Address to the Federal Assembly,
Putin characterized Chechnya as the supreme obstacle to keeping the country together: “Russia
has received a fundamental challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It has come face
78
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to face with a force striving to redraw the geopolitical map of the world.”80 Since the concept of
preserving territorial integrity has traditionally been one of the main features of strong
governance, it is unsurprising that taming Chechnya became the cornerstone of Putin’s state
building project, symbolizing the Kremlin’s control over its subjects.

Interestingly, after dealing with the Chechens for a long time, General Yermolov warned
the Imperial Center: “There has been no precedent yet of someone being able to force a Chechen
to fight his co-tribesmen; but the first step towards this has already been taken and it has been
impressed upon them that this will always be demanded of them.”81 This statement echoes the
official politics of ‘chechenisation’ (investing all power in the Kremlin’s chosen placeman)
invented by Putin’s Administration 160 years later. These politics sought to change the nature of
the conflict from “Russians against Chechens” to “Good Chechens against Rebellious Chechens”
by collaborating with loyal Chechens, notably the Kadyrovs. Ahmad Kadyrov’s dark past as a
mufti who proclaimed jihad against the Federation in the First Chechen war and his son’s being a
warlord who gave up school at the age of sixteen to fight on the side of Chechen rebels evoked
concerns about the limits of their contribution to strengthening the Russian state. Indeed, the
Western imagination strongly links evil, disorder, and failing states with the phenomenon of
warlords, be it in Somalia or Afghanistan. However, it is never too late to challenge the negative
connotations embedded in this concept in order to evaluate to what extent a warlord can in fact be
a ‘peacelord’, a figure who can help consolidate the state in places where the central government

80

“Address of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation”, The Kremlin, Moscow. 8 July 2000.
81
Moshe Gammer. The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule,
London: Hurst, 2006, p. 39.
30

lacks support from the local population or simply does not understand the traditional ways of
balancing local undercurrents of power.

Interestingly, despite Western fellow feelings toward Germany, the German Emperor was
also classified as a “warlord.” The explanation for this is quite simple: in times of war, he was the
commander-in-chief of all troops of the empire, which was expressed in his title “Kriegsherr.” As
a result, while the literal translation of “Kriegsherr” is “Warlord”, in German it implies that the
Emperor received this title only in war, while in peace he was obliged to share his power with the
executives of other German States of the Empire. 82 This example invites us to reflect more
thoroughly on our automatic demonization of warlords. Perhaps, we should perceive a warlord as
a temporary local kriegsherr who comes to fill in the vacuum of state governance in times of
trouble and, given his loyalty towards the center, helps strengthen the state. Indeed, the
possibility of finding a person with whom the local populace can identify and who knows the
intricate traditions of his kinsmen represents a powerful tool that can be used by large states to
maintain their territorial integrity, while fulfilling the task of keeping everyone satisfied. Is that
what Putin had in mind while making the decision to ‘lease’ Chechnya to the Kadyrovs in order
to put an end to the recurring conflict?
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6. The Lesser of Two Evils
«There are two people who horrify people in Chechnya - Shamil Basayev and Ramzan
Kadyrov»83
The beginning of Putin’s search for a political solution to the Chechen dilemma was quite
predictable. It consisted of selecting a relatively legitimate local leader to be President - or rather,
a submissive puppet. Akhmad Kadyrov emerged as a product of a major conflict between secular
nationalist forces and radical Islamist groups that reached its apogee after the First Chechen War.
The influence of the Salafis (radical religious groups) grew steadily after 1996 while nationalism
was struggling to remain the leading force of Chechnya’s march towards independence.
Consequently, even though initially Islam played a relatively insignificant role in the separatist
movement, the Chechen nationalist movement switched from being largely secular to being
primarily religious. Akhmad Kadyrov was a Sufi Muslim and did not identify strongly with the
radicals, even though, ironically, after becoming the Mufti of Chechnya, he agreed to bless the
jihad against the Russian state in 1995. Later, Salafis criticized him for being too lenient, which
was unacceptable in their “real and pure Islam project”. As a result, a conflict developed between
the Sufi and Salafi Muslims and eventually Akhmad Kadyrov chose to align himself with the
Russian leadership and to reinforce Sufi dominance in Chechnya: “Kadyrov-senior was a
“pragmatic nationalist” and a “pragmatic Sufi” not committed to a romantic ideal of Chechen
independence, but rather used nationalist appeals as a political instrument.”84
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Unfortunately for the Kremlin, Akhmad Kadyrov was not an efficient puppet: he was
despised as a corrupt and cold-hearted politician who quarreled with the political partners and
civil administrators Moscow foisted on him. Kadyrov preferred to rely on his relatives and his
own security force, led by his son Ramzan.85 The politics of chechenization seemed to bear no
positive result, since the rebels were raging across the country, flooding the media with
Chechnya-related news of instabilities. In October 2002, Chechen rebels seized the Dubrovka
Theatre in Moscow and held about 800 people hostage, demanding the withdrawal of Russian
forces from Chechnya and an end to the Second Chechen War. Most of the rebels along with
around 120 hostages were killed when Russian security forces stormed the building. It is
important to underline the symbolic message of the performance that people had come to see that
evening: Nord-Ost, a nationalist musical theatre production which, as its composer Georgi
Vasiliev put it “was a sort of protest against tarnishing our history, against not believing in your
own strength… a story that elevates us and our history… that enables us to look at our history not
as the history of class struggle, wars, and repressions, but a history of people and personal
achievements."86 This celebration of the Russian spirit, so in tune with Putin’s unfolding statism,
became a national tragedy for the Russian people and a personal dilemma for their President, who
found himself in direct confrontation with Shamil Basayev, whose organization Riyadus-Salikhin
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) claimed responsibility
for the siege.87
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After the incursion into Dagestan in 1999, Basayev repeatedly threatened to attack
Russian cities and boasted about training an army of “Black Widows” (Chechen female suicide
bombers) by himself. Ironically, the rebel was named after famous warrior Imam Shamil, who led
the mountain tribes' resistance to Tsarist armies in the nineteenth Century. Echoing the historical
legend, Basayev famously said that “Russia is the last empire: it is built on blood.” 88

Among

the attacks for which he claimed responsibility, one also finds the February 2004 bomb explosion
inside a Moscow subway car during morning rush hour, which took the lives of more than thirtynine people.89 Basayev took revenge on the ‘traitor’ Akhmad Kadyrov by organizing a bomb
explosion on May 9, 2004, two days after Kadyrov gained another term as president, at Grozny’s
Dinamo Stadium, where the Chechen leader and a number of other top Chechen and Russian
officials watched the World War II Victory Day celebration. Basayev published a message on the
Chechen website Kavkaz Center, in which he called the murders “Retribution”, and warned that
Putin and his Prime Minister Fradkov would soon meet a similar end. 90

Despite the magnitude of the threat, the Kremlin did not revise its politics in Chechnya
and chose another person to succeed Akhmad Kadyrov – Alou Alkhanov, who had no popular
base and was criticized by many observers as the pawn of the government: “The big question ...
is whether Mr Alkhanov will be able to run the war-ravaged region at least as well as his
predecessor ... Mr Alkhanov obviously lacks Mr Kadyrov's charisma and influence ... [and] has
no real power base of his own. He also has little influence over Chechen rebel leaders, and
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therefore stands little chance of convincing them to surrender their weapons.”91 The election of
the Kremlin-backed leader took place the weekend before the Beslan school hostage crisis on
September 1, 2004, and probably motivated the tragedy that took away the lives of more than 330
people, many of them children. The Beslan Crisis marks a turning point when Putin realized that
he must amend his politics in Chechnya, or he risked destroying his vision of a stronger Russia
under the pressure from Chechen extremists and their leader Shamil Basayev.
Described as “an astonishingly frank self-portrait”, the book Putin ot pervogo litsa (Putin
in the First Person, 2000) includes interviews with the former President, his wife, two daughters,
a former secretary, friends, and teachers.92 The informal setting of the interviews sheds light on a
number of personal fears and concerns that lingered in Putin’s mind longer than he expected: “If
we don’t stop the extremists now, then some time later we’ll be faced with another Yugoslavia in
the entire territory of Russia, the Yugoslavization of Russia…First Dagestan will be overrun.
Then the entire Caucasus would separate; that’s clear. Dagestan, Ingushetia, and then up the
Volga River to Bashkorstan and Tatarstan. This means advancing right into the middle of the
country.” Four years later, the President delivered a speech acknowledging the failure of his first
term, marked by the Beslan school siege: “We have to admit that we failed to recognize the
complexity and danger of the processes going on in our own country and the world as a whole.
At any rate, we failed to react to them adequately. We demonstrated weakness, and the weak are
beaten. Some want to tear off a big chunk of our country. Others help them to do it.”93 In the
same address, Putin indicated that Beslan became a turning point in his approach to Chechnya:
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“First, in the near future, a complex of measures aimed at strengthening the unity of our country
will be prepared. Second, I consider it necessary to create a new system of forces and means for
exercising control over the situation in the North Caucasus. Third, it is necessary to create an
effective crisis management system, including entirely new approaches to the work of law
enforcement agencies.”94 The only fact that the President excluded was that he had already found
a new representative to “create a new system of forces and means” – Ramzan Kadyrov, who at
that time was heading the Chechen President’s security unit known as SB (sluzhba bezopasnosti),
or kadyrovtsy. Choosing between two warlords, Basayev and Kadyrov Junior, Putin invested his
trust and money into the lesser of two evils.
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7. Kadyrov and Internal Governance: Chechen against Chechen
“No one trusts anyone else anymore, because Putin had a stroke of genius: he let Ramzan
Kadyrov do the dirty work. Now it’s Chechen against Chechen”95
Ramzan Kadyrov emerged on the horizon as “a traitor to Chechen nationalism and a man
who had been so insignificant during the first years of fighting that he had to borrow gas money
for his car.”96 Surprisingly, this “ill-prepared thug” eventually managed to monopolize power
over Chechen security forces in the territory. When he ascended to power, every public speech
was a shameful failure; his infamous public appearance in training clothes for audiences with
Putin elicited criticism and laughter. However, very shortly R. Kadyrov invaded the world of
media and drastically changed the headlines’ content: “Ramzan Kadyrov inspected a police
station; Ramzan Kadyrov visited a school and children hung around his neck; Ramzan Kadyrov
visited a hospital, talked to patients and asked them whether he could help.” 97 In spite of his
deficient education, Kadyrov knew how to operate within the Chechen clan network, which
explains a lot of his strategic success and his popularity in the eyes of the local population. The
great number of teips in Chechnya (more than 150) required a subtle way of balancing the power
among them, a process Kadyrov had mastered.

The Chechens are a tight-knit society based on extended families, or “teips” headed by
village elders. On the eve of the fist Russian invasion in 1994, there was a total of 7,000 village
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elders in Chechnya who had made the Parliament building in Grozny their headquarters.98 This
period can be characterized as the apogee of their power. The Council of Elders actively militated
against one-man rule, which at that point was practiced by Dudaev, because “the ethnic tradition
of Chechnya is the inter-clan consent…on the approximately equal representation in power
structure. (According to the Council) Chechnya could only be a parliamentary republic with a
parliament elected from single-mandate constituencies parceled out according to clan
traditions.”99 Certainly, the Kremlin never planned to allow for the existence of such a clan-based
Republic within its vast realm. The Center had to remodel this alternative hierarchical order to
adapt it to the general Moscow-vertical scheme, and the Benoi clan became the chosen recipient
of power. Akhmad and Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as Alu Alkhanov, who was the president of
Chechnya while Ramzan was waiting to reach the minimal legitimate age of 30, all belong to this
teip, which is now often referred to as the Kadyrov clan. Importantly, since the omnipotence of
any clan and any warlord was perceived as impossible in the context of the complex social
network, in the beginning of this affair, “everyone knew that Akhmad Kadyrov was a doomed
man. He knew it, too, as if he were walking a tightrope. He was threatened fighting Moscow, and
he was threatened even more fighting his old comrades-in-arms.” 100 Akhmad Kadyrov’s
presidency lasted less than a year: it was his son Ramzan who had to face all the risks of dealing
with the other clans and eliminating potential rivals.
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Granted the extensive support and sympathy of Putin after the Beslan school siege,
Ramzan Kadyrov did not have to worry about fighting Moscow – that war ended when his father
attained the Presidency. Ramzan could spend all of his energy and resources on consolidating the
supremacy of his clan: “In theory, the person appointed would have an unshakeable loyalty to
the federal center and not to the dominant clan. In practice, though, a person that adapted to the
situation in a senior post in Chechnya became not so much an instrument of the Kremlin but an
advocate for the ruling clan.”101 Undoubtedly, this new arrangement destabilized the Chechen
traditional law system, used for centuries to regulate everyday life. The unwritten rules supported
by the clan system dictate everything from prohibition of clan intermarriages, blood feud,
settlement of clans throughout territories to stealing sheep. But a growing number of people
worry about Ramzan Kadyrov’s detrimental modification of the intricate power balance because
his men “act outside both traditional and state laws, depriving locals of any protection against
crime.”102

To concentrate all power in his hands, Ramzan Kadyrov engaged in violent power
struggles with anyone who questioned his military authority, notably with such influential
Chechen warlords as the Yamadayev brothers, Said-Magomed Kakiev and Movladi Baisarov.
For Chechnya’s other warlords, his legitimized grip on power and the backing from Moscow
“meant the end of the road: Kadyrov was ruthless with enemies and rivals alike.”103 Movladi
Baisarov was a field-commander who switched over to the federal side in 2000 along with
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Akhmad Kadyrov, who later put Baisarov in charge of his security service. After the
assassination of Akhmat Kadyrov in 2004, his son Ramzan reorganized presidential security –
Baisarov left the service and formed the Gorets security unit, subordinated to the operationalcoordination department of the Federal Security Service (FSB) for the North Caucasus.
Unwilling to share his grip on power, Kadyrov perceived Baisarov’s refusal to obey as a threat
reinforced by Gorets’s leader’s constant critical remarks about the Chechen leader. For instance,
in October 2006, Baisarov gave an interview to the Moscow News, in which he denounced
Kadyrov as a “medieval tyrant.”104 Kadyrov’s response was prompt: in November, Baisarov was
gunned down in Moscow by a team of Chechen policemen, headed by Sultan Rashaev. Russian
prosecutors promptly judged the actions as “appropriate” while “Rashaev, incidentally, was the
chief bodyguard of Chechnya's First Deputy Prime Minister, Adam Demilkhanov, a known
confidante of Kadyrov’s.”105 To Kadyrov’s satisfaction, the Gorets unit was dissolved and its
fighters were re-integrated within various Chechen Interior Ministry units.

As for the Yamadayev brothers and Said-Magomed Kakiev, they commanded the only
ethnic Chechen battalions in the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defence – Vostok and Zapad
– that were not under the control of the Chechen government. The battalions "Zapad" were
created in 2003 under the supervision of GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye - Main
Intelligence Directorate). Kakiev’s Zapad was famously pro-Russian and opposed the separatist
leaders Dzhokhar Dudaev and Aslan Maskhadov. In stark contrast, the Yamadaevs’ Vostok was
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comprised of former rebels who switched to the Russian side during the second military
campaign. In light of their faithfulness and military efficiency, for the first time in the modern
history of Russia, three brothers from the same family (the Yamadaev family) were decorated
with the Hero of Russia medals.106 In addition to Moscow’s admiration of their courage, the
brother’s controlled Gudermes – the city that stands on the railroad junction between Rostov-onDon, Baku, Astrakhan, and Mozdok, making it a key trade center. Sulim Yamadaev, a Hero of
Russia and the commander of Vostok, embodied the family’s success and was the target of
Ramzan Kadyrov’s rage. The animosity between Kadyrov and Sulim Yamadayev exploded in
mid-April 2008, when Vostok fighters under the command of the youngest of the Yamadayev
brothers, Badrudi, did not yield the right of way to Kadyrov's motorcade and engaged in a shootout with members of Kadyrov's personal guard, which resulted in several deaths.107 In revenge,
the eldest Yamadayev brother, Ruslan, a former State Duma deputy, was killed in Moscow 5
months later. Sulim fled Russia and settled down in Dubai, but in March 2009 Adam
Delimkhanov, Kadyrov’s right-hand man, assassinated him.108

Hence, having “pacified” the Yamadaevs, Kadyrov disbanded their unit on counts of
forced disappearance, kidnapping, murder, and even patricide in 2004.109 The Yamadaev family
and the Kadyrov family share a long history of bloody feud; only Kakiev, who remained on the
sidelines and never questioned Kadyrov’s power, survived. In 2008, Kadyrov abolished both
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battalions.110 After defeating these major rival forces, Kadyrov has remained unchallenged. As
Stanislav Belkovskiy commented, “Kadyrov’s clan has real power, which is being used in its own
interests… Kadyrov’s clan is de facto not under Kremlin’s control. In fact, nobody knows what is
now going on in Chechnya. Kadyrov’s people monopolized the sphere of administration in the
republic, and the federal center is not only uninvolved in the process of administration, but also
does not receive any information about the real state of affairs. In a sense, Chechnya is already
separated from Russia.” 111 The lack of knowledge about the circumstances surrounding the
murder of Natalia Estemirova, a Russian civil rights activist, corroborates this claim. 112
Estemirova was an award-winning activist who documented hundreds of cases of abuse in
Chechnya. Importantly, her work for the Russian human rights group “Memorial” focused on
alleged human rights violations by government-backed security forces, which made her a persona
non grata in the eyes of Ramzan Kadyrov. In 2008, he requested to meet Estemirova in person
and chastised her for her work. According to the head of Memorial Oleg Orlov, Kadyrov openly
threatened Estemirova by confessing his readiness to kill her: "Yes, my hands are up to the
elbows in blood. And I am not ashamed of that. I will kill and kill bad people."113 Given the
Chechen leader’s many threats, there was little doubt about the person behind the murder.

However, the Kremlin’s inadequate reaction to the assassination appalled many Russian
and international human rights activists. While Dmitry Medvedev "expressed indignation at this
murder and ordered the head of the prosecutor general's investigative committee ... to take all
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necessary steps to investigate the killing,” 114 he rejected all claims about Kadyrov’s implication
in the crime. Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel and a number of other public figures in the
US and the EU condemned the crime as “outrageous” and urged Russia to clarify the
circumstances surrounding it. 115 Despite the international pressure to investigate Kadyrov’s
involvement, Medvedev said all the theories accusing the Chechen leader aimed to discredit the
cooperation between Moscow and Grozny. But could it not also be a sign of the Kremlin’s
inability to control the actions of Kadyrov, who knows he would remain unpunished for any
crime? Moreover, the halo of sanctity painted by Medvedev above Kadyrov’s head exhibits
Moscow’s unwillingness to reveal to the outside world the dark side of the power bargain
between the Center and the Republic: Kadyrov received the task of creating the illusion of a
peaceful, flourishing Chechnya by any means necessary, which explains his use of violence
beyond the Kremlin’s control.
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8. Chechenization, or Kadyrovization?
“From now on, April 16 will be marked as a national holiday”

In the military domain, Putin’s political project of «chechenisation» as the pivot of the
Republic’s normalization program consisted of transferring the responsibility for the anti-terrorist
operation (KTO) from the Russian Federal Army to the local Chechen security forces. The end of
the KTO in April 16, 2009 formalized Moscow’s military dependence on Ramzan Kadyrov.
Sergey Markedonov, one of Moscow’s most famous commentators on the North Caucasus, noted
that the end of the operation was “not so much a demonstration of the successes of the (federal)
government in the field of the struggle with terrorism as the definition (more or less formal) of
the arrangement of forces which had come into existence in Chechnya, one in which radical
autonomy was purchased by declarations of loyalty.” 116 Indeed, the republic’s authorities
consider the end of the operation the main achievement of the last decade due to the reversed
balance of power it introduced and consolidated, underscoring Ramzan Kadryov’s unmasked joy
when he told the Chechen media that “from now on, April 16 will be marked as a national
holiday.”117 In reality, ending the KTO meant that the Kremlin had “crowned Ramzan Kadyrov
to reign in the region and given him total freedom as the rightful and personal master of
Chechnya.”118 This enabled the Chechen government to establish effective customs posts, and
reduce the number of federal troops in the Republic, leaving public order and law enforcement
completely in the hands of Kadyrov.
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The gradual redistribution of power in Chechnya has been accompanied by a reduction of
the federal military staff stationed in the Republic. In 2003, the number of federal security forces
present in Chechnya reached its maximum of 120,000 soldiers. 119 Between 2004-2005, this
number decreased to 80,000 men. The number of federal soldiers remained the same – around
40,000 – from 2005 until the end of the KTO in 2009, which caused the withdrawal of 20,000
federal troops. However, for those recruited to do their military service in Chechnya, the
reduction in number does not mean much – the horror continues due to a clear antagonism
between Kadyrov’s forces and the federal soldiers. Afraid to go outside of their military bases,
federals live like hostages. The main base of Khankala comprises the only island in the Chechen
territory beyond Kadyrov’s control. The soldiers of the other two bases (Borzoi and Chali) are
neither as numerous nor as powerful.

Moreover, the decree from Oct 1, 2008 “Regarding the organization of the conscription of
citizens born between 1981-1990” signed by Kadyrov, reinforces this antagonism. The first
young men were summoned under the flag of Chechnya in August 2010. This process marks the
development of an independent Chechen army in the midst of the Russian Federation. The
recruited complete their military services in two security forces - Iug and Sever, controlled by the
Chechen MVD and created in 2006 to take over from Kadyrov’s ATCs. De facto, Ramzan
Kadyrov controls all four forces, making the Chechen army resemble the leader’s personal
possession.120 As the tables below show, all units controlled by the federal center and by the
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Chechen Ministry of Internal Affaires (MVD) found themselves under the watchful gaze of the
Chechen warlord.

Figure 2: Chechen security forces controlled by republican authorities
Security force

Year of
creation

Leader(s)

Function

1. Security service
of Akhmad
Kadyrov (sluzhba
bezopastnosti (SB),
or kadyrovtsy)

2001,
dismissed in
2006

Ramzan Kadyrov,
Ruslan Alkhanov

Created as a personal army of
the head of the Chechen
Administration. Certain parts of
SB were integrated as smaller
units into the official structures
of the Chechen Ministry of the
Interior during 2004 - 2006. This
created legal basis for financing
their activities. The majority of
SB were amnestied boeviki.

2. ATC (anti-terrorist 2005,
center)
dismissed in
2006

Muslim Ilyasov

Created to replace SB. After its
dismissal, the agents were
transferred into the battalions
South and North that from 2008
are under R. Kadyrov’s control.
After its closure, the head
Muslim Ilyasov became the
leader of the battalion North.

3. PPSM-2 (second
patrolling regiment
named after Akhmad
Kadyrov)

2004

Ibrahim Dadaiev,
Vahit Usmaev

Despite being created in order to
maintain order in Chechen cities,
the PPSM-2 dedicated its
activities to anti-terrorist
operations. It includes a big
number of ex-members of the
SB. Described by R. Kadyrov as
the cradle of the best leaders of
the Ministry of the Interior.

4. PPSM-1

2004

Ibrahim Dadaiev

Created as an auxiliary unit to
help PPSM-2. Its leader Ibrahim
Dudaev is Kadyrov’s placeman
who was heading the PPSM-2 in
2004.
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5. Neftepolk

2001

Cherip
Delimkhanov,
Adam
Delimkhanov

Created as a regiment of
surveillance of petroleum
infrastructure, this security force
often participates in anti-terrorist
operations. The majority of its
members are former boeviki. Its
leader Cherip Delimkhanov is
the successor of Adam
Delimkhanov, R. Kadyrov’s
right hand.

6. OMON

2000

Alikhan Tsakaev,
Ruslan Alhanov,
Musa
Gazimagomadov

Created as one of the original
branches of the MVD for the
anti-terrorist activities. OMON
has a big number of former SB
members. After the death of
Musa Gazimadov who tried to
manage this force independently,
nothing prevents R. Kadyrov
from controlling this force.

7. ROVD

Different in Different in every
every district district

Created as local police offices in
each district. The majority of
most ROVD are appointed by R.
Kadyrov in order to ensure their
full collaboration with the rest of
security forces.
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Figure 3: Security forces controlled by federal authorities
Security force

Year of
creation

Leader(s)

Function

1. Vostok (East)

2002

Sulim Yamadaev

Created by GRU (Glavnoe
Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie) as
a special monoethnic Chechen
battalion, attached to the 42nd
division of motorized infantry.
This unity is located in
Gudermes, a city that was fully
controlled by the Yamadaev
family – R. Kadyrov’s main
rivals. The unity employed
exclusively amnestied boeviki.
In 2008, after the elimination of
S. Yamadaev, the battalion
Vostok was dissolved.

2. Zapad (West)

2002

Said-Magomed
Kakiev

Similarly to Vostok, Zapad is
GRU’s creation that depended
on the 42nd motorized infantry
division. The battalion operates
close to the western border.
Kakiev refused to recruit former
boeviki, which made him fall
out of R. Kadyrov’s favor. In
2008, after the dismissal of
Kakiev, Zapad was dissolved.

3. Sever (North)

2006

Alimbek
Delimkhanov

4. Iug (South)

2006

Anzor
Magomadov

Both battalions belong to the
Chechen MVD. They were
created to follow the Antiterrorist centers’ mission and are
now controlled by R. Kadyrov.
Their function remains the same
– anti-terrorist operations and
assistance to other security
forces to maintain social order.
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5. Gorets

1999,
dismissed in
2006

Movladi Baisarov

Created as a special intervention
group under the control of FSB.
Movladi Baisarov was one of R.
Kadyrov’s main rivals who
escaped to Moscow and started
revealing the crimes committed
by the Chechen leader. Gorets
was dismissed after the
assassination of Baisarov in
November 2006.

6. ORB-2
(Operativnorazysknoe buro 2)

2002

Isa Surguev

Created to effectuate antiterrorist operations under the
control of the main office of the
Federal Ministry of the Interior.
The offices of ORB-2 are in
Grozny and Urus-Martan. The
former head of this force,
Ahmed Khasanbekov, was a
major rival of R. Kadyrov who
was constantly contesting the
Chechen leader’s monopoly on
the Republic’s security forces.
The new leader Isa Surguev is a
man of R. Kadyrov.
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9. Defining Winners and Losers: Who Owns the Laurel Wreath?
Even among the many concerns and questions about the true face of the Russian state and
its treatment of the federal subjects, the Chechen wars remain surrounded by conceptual
ambiguity. For instance, the Kremlin was unwilling to recognize the The Khasav-Yurt Accord
signed by Lebed and Maskhadov in August 1996 as Russia’s defeat even though it demanded the
withdrawal of all federal forces from Chechnya, thus giving the Republic de-facto independence.
Moreover, the theoretical existence of the entire second Chechen War remains unclear since in
the Kremlin’s terms, it was merely a “counter-terrorist operation.” It seems that Moscow
purposefully avoids the need to proclaim the victor: it would be too shameful to admit losing in
the First Chechen War and too undiplomatic to admit crushing the Chechens in the Second War.
Nevertheless, the government usually portrays the events that unfolded under Putin’s presidency
as a success story of how he tamed the unconquerable North Caucasus. However, does the mere
preservation of territorial integrity and the placement of a seemingly loyal warlord on top of the
local power hierarchy signify a true victory? The choice of the winner is a more nuanced matter,
and, in light of many facts, one can say that Chechnya should receive the second champion’s
laurel wreath as well.

Russian society has survived a great number of national tragedies caused by terrorist
operations, which seems to have paralyzed its ability to critically reflect on the actions of the
Kremlin in the North Caucasus. The permanent state of panic among the Russian populace
enabled Moscow to curb the threats emanating from the North Caucasus by any means possible.
At the end of Putin’s second term, however, an increasing number of politicians, analysts, and
writers started questioning and criticizing the Kremlin. In fact, Andrei Piontkovsky, a prominent
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Russian writer and analyst, who famously concluded that “Russia has effectively lost the war…
Moreover, Russia pays reparations as the losing side.”121 His remark emphasizes the dubious
status of the “counter-terrorist operation” as a successfully implemented project because the
figures suggest a completely different conclusion to the conflict. In recent years, Moscow has
financed more than 90% of Chechnya’s budget. According to the Accounting Chamber of the
Russian Federation, “the share of inter-budget transfers per capita in the North Caucasus (with
the exception of [the Russian city of] Stavropol) is almost twice that of the all-Russian average.
Last year, the federal center allocated 41,000 rubles per person in Chechnya, 20,000 in Ingushetia,
17,000 in Daghestan, and 13,000 to Kabardino-Balkaria.” 122 In 2010, the Kremlin gave 129
billion rubles ($4.2 billion) to the region, of which more than 40 percent went to Chechnya and
the rest was divided among the other five republics of the North Caucasus Federal District. To
put it in a larger perspective, the share of federal funds in the budget of Moscow is 3.6%, in
Bashkiria 19%, and in the Rostov district 34%.123

Moreover, in April 2011, Kadyrov demanded an additional $18 billion, which is nearly
10% of the total budget expenditure for all the Russian regions.124 According to his arguments,
Kadyrov needs the money to continue funding a peaceful transformation of the region, especially
improving the infrastructure. Since the federal expenditure on the North Caucasus, especially on
Chechnya, is commonly classified as necessary to repair the Republic after the destruction caused
121

Michael Schwirtz. “Russian Anger Grows Over Chechnya Subsidies,” The New York Times, 8/10/2011
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/europe/chechnyas-costs-stir-anger-as-russia-approacheselections.html?pagewanted=all
122
Paul Goble. “Russia: Colonial Rule Of North Caucasus Approaching End, Analyst Says,” Eurasia
Review, 28/03/2011 http://www.eurasiareview.com/28032011-russia-colonial-rule-of-north-caucasusapproaching-end-analyst-says-analysis/
123
Ibid.
124
Tom Washington. “$18 billion to transform Chechnya,” The Moscow News, 16/06/2011
http://themoscownews.com/russia/20110616/188758537.html
51

by two wars, the federal government seriously considers Kadyrov’s unimaginable demands,
which upsets many tax payers. “The North Caucasus is not ballast, but one of the pearls of
Russia… Through it, we affirm and defend a significant portion of our geopolitical interests in
this part of the world. For us this is very important” – explained Vladimir Putin in August 2011
when the dissatisfied voices of the public became louder. 125 Despite his attempts to justify
pumping large amounts of money into the North Caucasus, a variety of phrases like “Stop
Feeding the Caucasus!” resonate more and more in anti-Caucasian protest rallies, like the one
held on October 22, 2011 in Moscow. 126 People find it unfair that while Kadyrov leads a
construction boom in Chechnya, including the 45-storey business center, a multimillion-dollar
stadium, and an enormous mosque named after Akhmad Kadyrov, many regions in central Russia
still lack access to such basic amenities as regular electricity and heating.
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10. The Global and the Local: the Rules of the Oil Game
What makes the pearl of Chechnya so special and expensive, and what makes the Kremlin,
the self-proclaimed winner, so willing to pay the price? Despite ostensible post-war restoration
and integration, utilized as ‘noble causes’ for receiving subsidies from Moscow, the Chechen
unemployment rate soars at 70%. Semyon Rasin, director of the Russian branch of the
International Medical Corps, commented that one cannot see a clear pattern in the Republic’s
recovery and that “more or less normal life is concentrated in Grozny and Gudermes, while the
agrarian population is absolutely poor and lives only from their primitive agriculture."127 Why
would the winner subsidize a luxurious ball for the defeated party, which most of the ravaged
population cannot attend? There seems to be a different purpose behind the transfer of
unreasonable amounts of money to Kadyrov’s personal pocket – oil.

As it can be seen in figure 3 below, in the last twelve years Russia's dependence on oil
exports has noticeably grown. While in 2000, the share of oil revenue was at 34.8% of the federal
budget and even as low as 32% in 2002, the expected share of 2012 is 46.2%. Russia is on its
way towards becoming a petro-state, which suggests an increase in its dependence on natural
resources, leading to economic vulnerability because of unstable market prices. This
developmental pattern reinforces the country’s acute sense of ownership over every meter of oilrich territory.
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Figure 4: Percentages of Oil and Gas Revenues in the Russian Budget in the Period of 20002000
2013. 128

On a larger scale, it is important to illuminate Russia’s interest in the Caspian Sea’s vast
resources, and how Chechnya came to embody a vital threat to the federation’s economic wellwell
being. When, in August 1999, the Islamist militia led by Basayev and Khattab entered the
neighboring territory of Dagestan
tan in response to the encouragement of the Emir of the Islamic
Jamaat of Dagestan to liberate the Caucasus from Russia, the prospect of an independent
Chechen-Dagestani
Dagestani state became more real than ever.. At that critical moment, not only could
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Russia see its geopolitical influence in the North Caucasus and in the Caspian fading, but it faced
the real economic danger of losing Dagestan with its 249 miles of Caspian coast, which would
leave only 66 miles of coastline to the Federation, thus decreasing its share from 18.5% to 3.9%
of the Caspian. Significantly, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that the
Caspian’s proven oil reserves of 17-49 billion barrels could contain up to 235 billion barrels of
oil, which is equivalent to a quarter of the Middle East’s total proven reserves.129 Consequently,
the price of keeping Chechnya calm and well-fed from the Kremlin’s pocket pales in comparison
to the political and economic promises of the Caspian Sea.

Nevertheless, at the local level, the rules of the oil game are more nuanced. Chechen oil,
though not abundant, is of unusually high quality. The Republic’s capital, Grozny, was the site of
one of the USSR’s largest refineries, which was destroyed during the two wars. Grozneftgaz, a
company created in 2000 under the supervision of Mikhail Kasyanov, leads Chechnya’s oil
extraction. Even though 51% of shares belong to Rosneft, and 49% to the Chechen Republic, all
the profits from the sale of Chechen oil goes directly to Rosneft, while Grozneftegaz is simply
paid for services as an operator (8-10% of the general profit on the oil).130 The federal company’s
monopoly caused increasing illegal activities, varying from the government’s unregistered oil
sales to local residents’ house-run refineries. Importantly, during Akhmat Kadyrov’s presidency,
the Republic presented the first draft of an agreement with the federal center, in which it insisted
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that Chechnya should be allowed to control the income from oil. 131 Although the plan was
discontinued after the assassination of Akhmat Kadyrov, his son pursues the same goals.

In 2008, when Rosneft was considering building a new oil refinery in Kabardino-Balkaria,
Ramzan Kadyrov protested against this decision, claiming that Chechnya needs its own oil
refinery more than any other republic - in Grozny. He argued that while the anticipated oil
reserves of Chechnya for the next 10 years reached 20 million tons, the hypothetical,
undiscovered reserves of Kabardino-Balkaria were estimated at only 7 million tons. 132 Even
though the government of Kabardino-Balkaria and the Rosneft management had already signed
an agreement for construction of an oil refinery, Kadyrov’s desire to process the Chechen oil « at
home » proved successful. In 2010, Rosneft started working on a new project - building a new
facility in Grozny with the capacity of one billion tons per year, which is half of Chechnya’s
yearly oil extraction.133 Coupled with Ramzan Kadyrov’s numerous public statements in which
he expressed his wish to keep all the revenue from oil in the Republic, the prospect of having
such an extensive oil refinery elicits the question of how far the Kremlin is willing to go to keep
Kadyrov satisfied.
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11. Testing the Limits of Ambition: Kadyrov’s Islamization Project

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the North Caucasus was a major battleground
between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia. Faced with the menace of Russia’s
encroachment, Chechnya’s fragmented society sought support from the Ottoman Turks, which
led to the populace’s eventual adoption of Islam.134 The new religion took the form of Sufism, a
mystical form of Sunni Islam “particularly amenable to the Chechen's traditional highlander
culture, with its village-based individualism, egalitarianism, traditional practices, respect for
elders, and opposition to hierarchy.” 135 Furthermore, although originally “the significance of
Sufism for political thought lay primarily in the doctrine of political renunciation,” the Sufis’
“quietist” political stance had evolved into active political engagement over time and became one
of the channels of political activity that mobilized the Chechen population in the face of
Russia.136 At the same time, despite the integration into the multi-faceted self-definition of the
Chechen people, Islam was never the most significant part of their identity. Clan (teip)
membership and regional loyalty were as important as being Muslim. Consequently, after the
breakdown of the Soviet Union, nationalism propelled the separatist movement, while the role of
Islam remained comparatively weak.

However, the situation shifted after the first war against Russia, and the Chechen nationalist
movement became increasingly religious. Edward Walker explained this change in terms of the
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inspiration that Chechen fighters drew from the Afghan mujahadin and their struggle against the
Soviet military. The boeviki (Chechen guerilla fighters) sought help from Islamic groups and
countries abroad. Further, Islam’s valorization of martyrdom for ‘a good cause’ provided “an
effective ideology of resistance.”137 The rapid politicization of Islam laid the foundation for a
major change: in 1997, Chechnya declared itself an Islamic Republic, which eventually resulted
in the introduction of Sharia law as the basis of governance in 1999. At that point, Chechnya was
a society torn apart by the rivalries between President Aslan Maskhadov and field commanders
who sought to impose their own interpretation of Sharia, which rendered the rapid Islamization
of the Republic “a highly politicized process, reflecting domestic political struggles, social
dislocation, and foreign dependency.” 138 This development was also fuelled by the growing
popularity of Wahhabism, a Saudi-Arabian militant version of Islamic reformation, among the
Chechen resistance fighters. Thus, in contrast to the pre-first war period, not only did Islam
become the main form of self-identification of Chechens, but it was also increasingly perceived
as “the symbol of opposition to the contemporary Russian state and Christian civilization as a
whole.”139

The Kadyrov family started their political ascent on the ‘wrong side’. While acting as
Mufti of Chechnya, 140 Akhmad Kadyrov, who identified himself as a Sufi, declared jihad on
Russia in 1995. Eventually, he found himself in a conflict with the Islamic militancy because of
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their “puritanical inspiration” and their close ties with Saudi Arabia.141 As a result, he aligned
himself with the Kremlin in 1999, but viewed this change of sides as a way to advance Sufism in
the Republic. After Akhmad Kadyrov’s death in 2004, Ramzan adhered to his father’s vehement
critique of Wahhabism, and even tried to present the war in the North Caucasus as a religious
confrontation between traditional Sufi Islam of Chechnya and the “Wahhabi heresy.” 142 The
young Chechen leader has been criticized for exploiting Islam and distorting Chechen Sufi
traditions to serve his own ambitions, as indicated in the 2011 Annual Report of the US
Commission on International Religious Freedom. Moreover, according to the document, Ramzan
Kadyrov declared that “Chechnya would be better off if it were ruled by Sharia law” even though
it “contradicts secular Russian constitutional and legal precepts.”143 For instance, while Russia's
Supreme Court overturned a 1997 Interior Ministry ruling that forbade women from wearing
headscarves in passport photos, Ramzan Kadyrov issued an edict in 2007 ordering women to
wear headscarves in state buildings in Chechnya.144 Kadyrov publicly expressed his support for
men who fired paintballs at women who violate the strict dress code. Moreover, the Chechen
leader describes women as the property of their husbands and says that their main role is to bear
children; he actively encourages polygamy even though it is illegal in Russia.145 And yet, some of
Kadyrov’s statements actively contradict Sharia. For instance, when male relatives murdered a
substantial number of young females in 2008 and 2009, Kadyrov justified the “honor killings”
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and said that the women were killed rightfully: “If a woman runs around and if a man runs
around with her, both of them are killed.” 146 However, Shahrzad Mojab, an Iranian-born
University of Toronto professor of women’s studies, notes that honor killings don't have "any
definite connection with religion at all," pointing out that they had been practised before any
major religion came into existence.147 As a result, the Chechen legal space embodies a complex
system of Islam, Russian law, and medieval traditions that coexist under Kadyrov’s personal
control.

Paradoxically, the Chechen leader is on his way to building an Islamic republic within
Russia’s legally secular political space. Oliver Bullough, a prominent Reuters Moscow
correspondent, travelled across the entire North Caucasus and interviewed people that varied
from Ramzan Kadyrov to Chechen and Dagestani rebel leaders, trying to trace the dynamics of
Ramzan’s rise to power. He observed that many radical rebels, who considered the Kadyrov
family as traitors in the past, have been changing their minds in light of the recent development:
“Kadyrov, though he pays lip service to the Kremlin, has a style of government far removed from
the nominal democracy in Russia proper. He has imposed elements of Sharia law just like the
rebel government before him.”148 When Kadyrov was elected as Chechnya’s President, he started
engineering a fusion of selected elements of Chechen Sufism149 and more dogmatic Sunni Islam
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that was followed primarily by the official clergy and therefore was more state-controlled.150 The
resulting synthesis allowed Ramzan to position himself as a promoter of the traditional Chechen
national identity, while also granting him the ability to gain more control over the religious life of
the Republic.151 Thus, in 2010, Kadyrov decreed a uniform schedule for daily prayers, instituted
the ideological examination of all imams, and dismissed those deemed incompetent. An
anonymous cleric later complained that these dismissals were simply a “pretext to enable the
Muslim Spiritual Board to kill two birds with one stone: to get rid of those imams who refused to
brand as "wahhabis" anyone who expresses the slightest dissatisfaction with or dissent from
Kadyrov's policies, and to provide jobs for a surfeit of unemployed mullahs.”152

One should also note the growing presence of Islam in the architectural landscape of
Chechnya. In 2008, Putin and Kadyrov opened the grandiose Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque,
allegedly the largest in Europe. In addition to this, four new mosques were built in October 2009,
and many more are still under construction. In 2009, Kadyrov opened the Russian Islamic
University and the largest Islamic center of medicine in Europe.153 These rapid changes prompt a
great number of Russian commentators to hypothesize that Kadyrov has advanced further toward
establishing an Islamic state than the leaders of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria ever dreamed of
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doing.154 However, unlike Maskhadov, who proclaimed Sharia law in 1999, Kadyrov has not
formally done so, and even emphasized the importance of abiding by Russian laws. The
contradictions in Kadyrov’s discourse were brought to the surface by Le Figaro’s journalist
Pierre Avril in 2010 who published an article titled “Tchétchénie: les deux faces du régime
Kadyrov.” In this article, he quotes Kadyrov as saying that in Chechnya Sharia law is above the
laws of the Russian Federation.155 Kadyrov's press spokesman immediately claimed that Kadyrov
had been misquoted and demanded an apology. The Kremlin turns a blind eye on the Islamic
renaissance orchestrated by Chechnya’s leader, only augmenting the ambiguity of his
declarations of loyalty to the federal Center.

In light of the extensive Islamization of the Chechen socio-political space, many Russian
Muslims started perceiving Kadyrov as the leader of the entire ummah.156 Based on the reputation
of a genuine Islamic politician, he even started competing with Tatarstan for the claim of Muslim
leadership within the Russian Federation: "Chechnya is now actively positioning itself not only
as a relatively autonomous part of Russia but also as a Muslim center. It is competing for the role
of leader."157 One of the best illustrations of this rivalry lies in architecture: the Akhmat Kadyrov
mosque exceeds the size of Tatarstan’s main mosque, formerly considered the largest in Russia.
Chechnya is also trying to become the new venue of the Islamic Movie Festival, traditionally
held in Kazan. The confrontation between the Republics could have dangerous repercussions for
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the Russian Federation’s religious equilibrium, promoted by Tatarstan. While 90 percent of
Chechnya's 1.1 million people are Muslim, Tatarstan’s 3.7 million population is split into 43
percent Muslim and 40 percent Russian Orthodox, whose peaceful co-existence has been
portrayed as a successful project of multiculturalism.158 The neutrality of Tatarstan’s religious
scene not only stems from the relatively equal numbers of both affiliations, but also from the
particular model of moderate “Euro-Islam” that prevails in the Republic. Scholars view Tatar
“Euro-Islam” as a consequence of jadidism, a movement that originated among the Volga Tatar
intelligentsia in the early twentieth century and sought to continue the traditions of Muslim
philosophy, while also integrating Western European ideas of the Enlightenment in their version
of Islam.159

Comparing the role of religion in the political spheres of Chechnya and Tatarstan, the
differences are clear. According to Tatarstan’s constitution, the Republic is a secular state
(Art.11), which means that religion and religious groups are separate from the State.160 Thus,
Muslim leaders do not interfere in government affairs nor does the state try to police their actions.
On the other hand, in Chechnya, Kadyrov assumes the role of a spiritual leader rather than
remaining a secular politician. Russian analyst Nikolai Petrov interprets his rise as a threat to the
entire federation: "If Chechnya, from a de facto autonomous Russian region, becomes the leader
of a whole group of regions, we will face a very dangerous situation."161 The stark contrasts
between the Tatar and Chechen versions of Islam and the menace that comes from their
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competition pose a difficult question to the Kremlin: do, or should Kadyrov’s ambitious projects
have any limits? The fact that the Center allows the Chechen leader to engineer an Islamic
republic in the territory that it supposedly controls casts doubt upon the future of the federation as
a Great Power.
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12. Conclusion
In this project, I reexamined Russia’s decision to permit the existence of the Chechen
enclave within its territory based on the calculation that it would eventually enable the reemerging Great Power to enhance its internal strength. Superficially, Chechnya adopted the
Tatarstan Model and seems to have embarked on a path of collaboration with the federal center,
which would mean that the Kremlin attained what it wanted – territorial cohesion and the
monopoly of control, both essential components of being a Great Power. Indeed, Ramzan
Kadyrov persistently claims to be Putin’s most faithful ally, and Putin’s victory in the recent
election in March 2012 proves the success of their joint state-building efforts: Chechen
authorities reported turnout at 99.5%, with 99.82% of voters backing Putin, while his closest rival
Gennadiy Zyuganov won only 0.04%. 162 Based on this statement of overflowing love and
admiration towards Moscow, the Kremlin can surely indulge itself in believing in Russia’s reestablished ‘greatness’. In the end, cooperating with Ramzan Kadyrov did ensure the desirable
effect of Chechnya’s full conversion to the right side, thus putting an end to the centuries-long
conflict.

However, my research suggests that the metamorphosis of Chechnya into Tatarstan never
really happened – the conflict simply entered a latent phase and thus poses a great threat to
Russia’s future as a Great Power. The clue to understanding the Chechen menace lies in the
circumstances surrounding the birth of the alleged friendship between the Center and the
rebellious Republic. Putin’s early mission sought to reclaim Russia’s eminence as a strong state
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in the international arena, which made the resolution of the Chechen question essential for the
country’s further political and economic development. The limits of the Federation’s patience and
budget precluded launching futile military campaigns against Chechen territory. Putin had to
resort to negotiations with the rebels, hoping to create a local puppet government that would
advance his personal interests. Naturally, managing the conflict with the hands of a Chechen was
a ‘cleaner’ solution that would not affect the Federation’s reputation on a larger scale. During the
Presidencies of Akhmad Kadyrov and Alou Alkhanov, the presence of Moscow in their internal
affairs remained significant, which was illustrated by the great number of federal troops stationed
in Chechen territory. The situation changed radically with the Beslan school hostage crisis in
September 2004. Putin admitted that the tragedy symbolized the failure of his first term, because
Russia was still weak and had failed to tame the rebels of Chechnya.

Faced with such a critical situation, Putin decided to sign a ‘Faustian pact’ with Ramzan
Kadyrov: Chechnya would possess an unprecedented level of autonomy, financed by the Kremlin,
but in return the unorthodox Chechen warlord was to bring order to the Republic and orchestrate
a spectacle of friendship, peace, and prosperity. As if commenting on the results of this powersharing agreement, Ramzan Kadyrov once said that Chechnya owes its very existence to the
efforts of Vladimir Putin: "If it were not for Putin, Chechnya would not exist… He saved our
people with his strong-willed decisions… I know this history - I personally participated in it. If it
were not for Putin, we would not be here."163 In a paradoxical way, the Chechen leader was right
- the level of autonomy enjoyed by the Republic at present can be viewed as de facto
independence.
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Having examined the unwavering consolidation of Kadyrov’s rule, notably the
monopolization of security forces and the Islamization of public space, I conclude that, in the
long run, Russia will not benefit from this intricate relationship of political convenience. When in
2004 the Kremlin gave Kadyrov carte blanche to tame the Chechen nation, it effectively
transferred sovereignty over the Republic to the former rebel, thus transforming Chechnya into a
space impermeable to Moscow’s control. While Kadyrov is busy rebuilding the war-ravaged
country with federal money, he remains interested in being the Kremlin’s ally. However, if one
day Moscow attempts to restrain his reign in order to restore the cohesion of the Federation’s
sovereignty, the peace and control bought through the bargain may prove illusory.

One can surely try to explain the paradox of Chechnya by scrutinizing the methods
employed by the Russian leaders as they were striving to construct a stronger state: heavy
reliance on the “power vertical” and the principles of loyalty resulted in the Center’s weakness in
the face of Kadyrov, who emerged as the actual winner of Russia’s second military campaign. At
the same time, our analysis suggests that the Russo-Chechen friendship project has dubious
prospects in light of the long history of resistance and the traumatic memories fresh in the minds
of the Chechen people. Russia might eventually discover that reasserting its Great Power status
and keeping Chechnya on a leash are mutually exclusive geopolitical objectives that, if pursued
simultaneously, negate the promise of a trouble-free future.

On a larger scale, we can observe that the peculiar relationship between Moscow and the
North-Caucasian Republic challenges the well-established classification of states as strong, weak,
failing, or failed entities. Traditionally, such ranking is based on the “ability or inability to deliver
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high qualities and quantities of political goods”, the most important of which is security, or “the
projection of state power, the state monopoly of violence, and human security.”164 According to
this categorization, Russia can claim the title of a strong state in all of its vast territory except for
Chechnya. There, it exhibits the characteristics of a failed state whose legitimacy has gradually
eroded over the past ten years. The Republic embodies an “ungoverned space” where the Federal
center does not exercise effective sovereignty since territorial control has been ceded to a
different political player. 165 For this reason, one can envision the border with the Chechen
Republic as a passage into a different socio-political reality with its own laws of lawlessness.

In light of this discrepancy, the rigid state categorization should be reevaluated. Theorists
should embrace the new concept of a “failed strong state,” or admit the inadequacy of sharply
drawn political distinctions. In fact, the modern state is not a homogenous entity that can ensure
full control within its boundaries. It incorporates numerous alternative structures of competing
authorities that can vary from the uncontrollable Parisian banlieue or Facebook’s virtual space, to
a de facto independent country like Chechnya. The ideal of achieving the monopoly of violence
over a fixed territory is becoming increasingly unattainable, as sovereignties overlap and states’
political spaces look more like mosaics of compromises between key players. The face of
sovereignty is changing, and so is the nature of Great Power politics. The leading states of the
international arena confront the new political paradigms of post-modernity; they must redefine
their methods of internal and external governance and categorization as old antagonistic notions
of strong and weak become increasingly blurred.
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